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During the early Cold War, the threat of nuclear war drove 
many governments around the world 
to urge their citizens to build fallout 
shelters in which they could wait 
out the deadliest period following 
an attack. A thermonuclear bomb, 
detonating at ground level, would 
scatter intensely radioactive particles 
hundreds of kilometres downwind of 
the explosion. Numerous explosions 
would blanket southern Canada with 
fallout, which would kill millions 
of citizens. Herman Kahn, the 
RAND Corporation analyst whose 
outspoken views formed the genesis 
of Stanley Kubrick’s doomsday movie 
Dr. Strangelove, drily commented in 
his 1960 dissection of thermonuclear 
war that “the radiation from fallout 
has curious and frightening effects.”1 
Ultimately, a high dose of radiation, 
as observed by doctors and military 
officials following the attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki  and 
postwar nuclear tests, leads to a 
prolonged breakdown of the body, 
characterized by nausea, bleeding 
gums, internal haemorrhaging, hair 
loss, painful radiation burns, fever, 
delirium, and death.2 In the postwar 
period, civilian and military planners 
hoped that the population would be 
able to limit their exposure to the most 
lethal doses of radioactivity after an 
attack by taking shelter underground. 
With fallout shelters, citizens could 
possibly survive an attack, even if 
they emerged to a destroyed world, 
where increased risks of cancer, 
birth defects, and widespread illness 
would be the norm.3 
Some governments, most notably 
Sweden, invested large amounts of 
money to dig massive communal 
shelters to house tens of thousands 
of citizens, and forced the housing 
industry to include shelters in 
every new building. The Canadian 
government took a much less 
interventionist route. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker, provincial premiers, 
and local officials unsuccessfully 
advised homeowners to build shelters 
at their own expense. The Emergency 
Measures Organization widely 
distributed blueprints for a shelter 
that homeowners could construct for 
a cost of $500 (approximately $4,000 
today). The accompanying designs 
were meant to create the impression 
that safety was both simple and 
reasonably affordable. The price, 
nearly 10 percent of the average 
Canadian income, was beyond the 
means of most Canadians, however. 
The federal government, for its 
part, firmly stood by a position that 
it could not afford to get into the 
business of building fallout shelters 
for millions of Canadians. 
Yet at the same time, the federal 
government became the largest 
builder of fallout shelters in the 
country, investing millions of dollars 
in a secret crash program between 
1959 and 1963. Some aspects of this 
project were controversial, such as the 
blast shelter in Carp, Ontario, meant 
to house military and government 
officials. A Toronto reporter who 
Abstract: During the early Cold War, 
the Canadian government advised the 
public that they could cheaply build 
fallout shelters in their homes to protect 
their families from radiation after a 
nuclear war. Publicly, the government 
stayed out of the shelter-building 
business, citing that the cost was too 
high. However, from 1959 to the mid-
1960s, the Canadian Army secretly 
constructed a network of 2,000 fallout 
shelters in government buildings: 
the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout 
Reporting System. This article explores 
the origins of this network and the 
reasons for its decline.
Résumé : Au début de la guerre froide, 
le gouvernement canadien a informé la 
population qu’elle pouvait construire 
à faible coût des abris antinucléaires 
dans leur maison afin de protéger 
leur famille d’éventuelles retombées 
nucléaires après une guerre nucléaire. 
Publiquement, le gouvernement s’est 
tenu à l’écart de la construction de ces 
abris en affirmant que le coût aurait été 
trop élevé pour lui. Cependant, de 1959 
au milieu des années 1960, l’Armée 
canadienne a secrètement construit 
un réseau de 2 000 abris antinucléaires 
dans des immeubles gouvernementaux 
: le Nuclear Detonation and Fallout 
Repor t ing  System (système de 
déclaration de détonation nucléaire et 
d’abris). Cet article explore les origines 
de ce réseau et les raisons de son déclin.
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discovered the bunker 
during its construction 
gave it the nickname 
“Diefenbunker.” Much 
to the embarrassment 
of the prime minister, 
the nickname stuck.4 
S h e l t e r s  l i k e  t h e 
Die fenbunker  and 
s imi lar  provinc ia l 
sites were intended to 
provide for continuity 
o f  g o v e r n m e n t 
authority during a 
national crisis,  but 
drew much public 
criticism as evidence 
of  a  government’s 
willingness to pursue 
self-preservation rather 
than national survival. 
One Vancouver couple 
expressed their anger 
about  government 
shelters in a scathing 
letter to Diefenbaker in 
response to a televised 
civil defence exercise 
in the spring of 1961: 
“We sincerely hope 
that neither you nor 
any Civil Servants with 
access to Government 
shelters will be found 
dead, trampled in the 
rush to the entrance 
to the shelters, when 
those who got there first emerge in 
two weeks to mourn and bury the 
rest of us.”5
 Less well-known than the 
Diefenbunker, but essential to the 
government’s post-attack planning, 
was the Nuclear Detonation and 
Fallout Reporting System (NDFRS). 
This network comprised more than 
2,000 fallout shelters modelled on the 
blueprints distributed to Canadian 
families, and installed secretly 
in government buildings across 
the country. The Canadian Army 
hoped to have the network in place 
quickly. The military was, however, 
unprepared for the complexity and 
difficulty of a project as seemingly 
simple as installing cinder-block 
shelters in basements. The project 
took three years, at a cost of over $3 
million, but even so the final results 
were significantly less substantial 
than the military had originally hoped 
to achieve. The NDFRS provides 
an interesting case study of the 
challenges of emergency planning in 
peacetime and the politics of shelter-
building in Canada. Remnants of 
the NDFRS are present in hundreds 
of communities across southern 
Canada, a material record, in mortar 
and cinderblock, of the 
desperation of efforts 
to survive the Cold 
War. 
T h e  C a n a d i a n 
military first entered 
the shelter-building 
business as a result 
of two factors:  the 
rapid progress of the 
Cold War arms race, 
and the inability of 
federal, provincial, and 
local civilian defence 
agencies to keep pace 
with the changing 
threa t  to  Canada . 
Thermonuc lear  or 
h y d r o g e n  b o m b s , 
d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e 
superpowers in the 
early 1950s, nullified 
the  p lans  o f  c iv i l 
d e f e n c e  a g e n c i e s 
tasked with defending 
life and infrastructure. 
Planners in Canada, 
the  United States , 
a n d  t h e  U n i t e d 
Kingdom previously 
developed strategies 
that incorporated fire-
fighting and rescue 
p r i n c i p l e s  t e s t e d 
during Second World 
War bombing raids. 
Atomic weapons were 
powerful enough to destroy parts of 
cities, but thermonuclear weapons 
threatened to wipe out entire cities 
in a flash. The only solution civil 
defence planners suggested was not 
to be there when the bomb went off.6 
By 1954, Canadian officials began 
to plan for the evacuation of major 
target cities within three hours of 
receiving an attack warning. These 
arrangements included arrangements 
to control traffic movement, allay 
public panic, billet and care for 
evacuees, but tended to ignore the 
lethal effects of radioactive fallout. 
Without shelter, evacuees would 
The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (above) ushered in a 
new era in civil defence. The destructive potential of atomic weapons 
forced the Canadian government to address the issue of protecting its 
citizens in a manner that had previously never been considered.
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survive the bomb but die from 
radiation illness in the countryside. 
The mushroom cloud resulting 
from a thermonuclear explosion 
would spread irradiated ash and dust 
in the upper atmosphere, poisoning 
the environment for hundreds 
of kilometres downwind of the 
explosion. Even if, as some planners 
believed, the country escaped direct 
attack, nuclear detonations in the 
United States would still threaten 
national survival. The Canadian 
military recognized the risks posed 
by thermonuclear weapons by 
1954, but Canadian civilian defence 
agencies, chronically underfunded 
and divided among three levels of 
government, fumbled for years to 
find an effective solution before 
settling on the family fallout shelter 
as the best of the few options available 
that might save lives. The situation 
prompted a national review of civil 
defence planning by retired chief 
of the general staff Lieutenant-
General Howard Graham, who 
recommended in late 1958 that the 
armed forces should assume primary 
responsibility for coordinating 
national survival efforts, supported 
by other government departments. 
In May 1959, the federal cabinet 
passed a Privy Council order that 
incorporated many of Graham’s 
recommendations. Among other 
challenging tasks, the Canadian 
Army was assigned the responsibility 
to create and maintain an attack 
warning system, detect nuclear 
explosions, and monitor levels of 
radioactive fallout over Canadian 
territory.7 These responsibilities 
eventually brought the military 
into the business of building fallout 
shelters across the country. 
Large government blast shelters 
such as the Diefenbunker served two 
purposes – to house key government 
officials in order to ensure continuity 
of government through an attack, and 
to house a military communications 
network capable of keeping links 
open to different parts of the country 
during the opening stages of a war. 
Provincial and municipal shelters 
were linked in to this network, 
as were key military facilities in 
Canada and the United States. The 
trouble with the system as it was 
originally devised was that, once 
in the shelters, government officials 
would be cut off from the outside 
world. Without reliable reports 
about local conditions, emergency 
measures officials would be unable 
to advise the public about when it 
was safe to emerge from their home 
fallout shelters and commence the 
arduous process of rebuilding. The 
Nuclear Detonation and Fallout 
Reporting System (NDFRS) was 
designed to serve as the eyes and ears 
of the country. 
Efforts to create the NDFRS 
began in earnest in August 1959, 
shortly after the Cabinet Committee 
on  Emergency  P lans  (CCEP) 
approved the army’s plans for a 
National Survival Attack Warning 
System, the network of air raid sirens 
installed across the country. The 
Royal Canadian Air Force, the service 
that was originally responsible for 
radiation monitoring, developed 
the original plans for the system 
before the transfer of responsibility 
to the army.8 The army worked 
with a study group composed of 
representatives of the navy, air force, 
Defence Research Board, and other 
government agencies to develop 
recommendations for Cabinet. This 
group looked at what the United 
Kingdom and the United States had 
done to create a radiation monitoring 
network. By early 1960, the British 
had settled on plans to develop a 
grid of 1,500 hardened fallout shelters 
equipped with Geiger counters and 
telephone lines that could report 
radiation levels to the Home Office. 
This system would be operated by 
volunteer staffs and members of the 
Ground Observer Corps, a volunteer 
organization that had been created to 
report suspicious aircraft movements 
over the United Kingdom.9 In the 
United States, different military and 
government agencies at the federal, 
state, and local levels had some 
capability for radiation reporting. 
The Office of Civil Defence and 
Mobilization (OCDM) had, however, 
proposed the creation of a Fixed 
Federal Monitoring Network, where 
fully automated, remotely-monitored 
radiation sensors would be installed 
on approximately 6,000 federal 
government buildings to transmit 
data from which OCDM could 
determine fallout patterns.10 
The Canadian study group, 
observing the technological and 
financial  challenges posed by 
developing an automated system 
from scratch, looked to create 
something closer to the British model 
of shelters manned by volunteers. 
They proposed two types of fallout 
shelters. The first, nuclear detonation 
reporting posts, would be established 
around Canada’s main target cities: 
Victoria,  Vancouver,  Calgary, 
Edmonton, Winnipeg, Windsor, 
London, Niagara Falls, Hamilton, 
Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Québec, 
Saint John, Halifax, and St. John’s. 
Each city would be ringed with three 
or more fallout shelters equipped with 
specialized equipment to determine 
the location and height of blasts, and 
the approximate destructive power of 
each bomb detonated over Canadian 
territory.11 This information would 
assist planners to determine the 
extent of immediate casualties and 
begin to predict fallout coverage. 
The second, far more numerous type 
of shelter, was the fallout reporting 
post.
A Defence Research Board study 
in 1956 had investigated the projected 
shape of fallout clouds that would 
form downwind after explosions 
in Canada and the United States. 
It determined approximately 2,000 
posts would be required to effectively 
monitor radiation intensity on the 
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ground. The posts would need to be 
situated in a grid south of the 55th 
parallel, with posts 15 miles apart 
on the north-south axis and 45 miles 
apart from east to west. The RCAF 
had adopted these findings as the 
foundation for the national network 
in its early planning work in 1959.12 
The Canadian Army built on these 
assumptions when finalizing plans 
for the system. 
To save money and speed 
completion of the network, the Army 
recommended to Cabinet that shelters 
could be installed in Department of 
National Defence 
faci l i t ies ,  Royal 
Canadian Mounted 
Police detachments, 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f 
Transport weather 
stations, provincial 
police stations and 
Lands and Forests 
departments ,  as 
well as in railway 
stations.13 A brief 
survey had revealed 
that using these 
sites alone could 
account for nearly 
three-quarters of 
the national grid, 
covering everything 
from the urban core of target areas to 
the sparsely populated countryside.
The detonation and fallout 
reporting posts would communicate 
their findings to filter centres, fallout-
protected regional facilities located 
in federal properties, which would 
verify post reports and forward them 
to the federal and provincial bunkers 
for analysis. In an emergency, the 
government would use the data to 
advise families about relative levels 
of safety across the country, prepare 
evacuation orders for areas facing 
lethal levels of fallout, and advise 
homeowners by radio broadcast 
about when the most lethal period 
following an attack ended. (See 
Figure 1.) The Army’s study group 
forwarded its recommendations to 
the CCEP, which gave approval in 
principle on 29 June 1960.14 Then 
began the slow and difficult task of 
actually building the system. 
The work to move from the 
concept  to  ac tual ly  breaking 
ground on shelters took nearly two 
years. Approval from the CCEP 
did not immediately bring funds 
from the Treasury Board to pay for 
construction and materials. More 
important, Cabinet approval did not 
guarantee participation by provincial 
or municipal government agencies, 
let alone outside partners like the 
national rail systems, whose support 
had to be solicited. Most ready to 
cooperate was the military. The 
newly-formed Directorate of Survival 
Operations and Plans presented the 
concept to the area commanders 
responsible for the Army’s operations 
within Canada in the late summer of 
1960. In January 1961, Lieutenant-
General S.F. Clark, the chief of the 
general staff, directed each command 
to begin investigating possible shelter 
locations and to open discussions 
with provincial agencies and deliver 
an early report about proposed 
locations in their areas of jurisdiction. 
The directive contained what proved 
to be an optimistic schedule for 
completion, to have all nuclear 
detonation posts operational by 1 July 
and all fallout posts ready to report 
by 31 December 1961.15 
Area commands reported back 
to Army Headquarters with their 
results that spring. Each command 
carried out map studies to determine 
suitable locations for fallout shelters 
throughout their  areas,  using 
existing federal buildings as much 
as possible. The process of mapping 
out where the shelters would go also 
resulted in greater scrutiny of the 
possible weaknesses of the system. 
M a j o r - G e n e r a l 
John Rockingham, 
c o m m a n d e r  o f 
Quebec Command, 
noted that most 
of the proposed 
shelters would use 
existing civil ian 
communications 
l i n e s .  M o s t  o f 
these ran through 
M o n t r e a l ’ s 
main  exchange . 
M o n t r e a l ’ s 
destruction would 
therefore cripple 
fallout reporting 
a n d  n a t i o n a l 
survival  e f for ts 
in Quebec. Even if Montreal was 
spared the direct effects of attack, 
no provision had been made to 
p r o v i d e  f a l l o u t  s h e l t e r s  f o r 
civilian switchboard operators, so 
communications would still be non-
existent. Resolving this problem 
would require the introduction of 
military communications outlets in 
many proposed sites. 
Rockingham also indicated that 
federal buildings could only house 
a fraction of the shelters required for 
effective reporting in the province. 
Provincial or private agencies, such 
as the national railways, forestry 
companies, or power generating 
firms, would need to be brought in 
to the project. Success depended 
NUDET and FRP report to Filter Centre or direct to provincial 
bunkers
Filter Centres collate data from outposts, send reports 
to federal and provincial emergency government bunkers
Emergency government headquarters staff plot 
nuclear detonations and fallout patterns
Air raid sirens and emergency radio broadcasts inform 
public when to emerge from shelter or evacuate
Figure 1: Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting 
System (NDFRS) Communications
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on these private firms’ 
interest  in committing 
their facilities and staff 
members to the NDFRS 
system. Work on nuclear 
detonation reporting posts 
appeared to have been 
simpler because the military 
could in most cases use 
its own installations near 
target cities.
Finally, Rockingham 
identified the system’s 
l a rges t  f l aw.  What  i f 
the shelters were built, 
but nobody decided to 
volunteer to report from 
them during an emergency? 
Rockingham noted that “it is 
unrealistic to expect a man 
to operate in a fallout shelter 
for 14 days if his family is 
also not supplied with a 
shelter. Hence these [FRPs] 
should be large enough to 
accommodate the operator 
and his family.”16 
Obtaining assistance 
from external agencies 
would be key to meeting 
the system’s schedule for 
completion. However, the 
military did not have authority 
to contact the Canadian National 
and Pacific Railways, or begin 
preparations for shelters at provincial 
sites until July 1961.17 The pace 
changed in August, as superpower 
confrontation over access to Berlin 
threatened imminent nuclear war. As 
the crisis reached its peak, the United 
States persuaded its allies to increase 
their general military preparedness 
and funding for civil defence.18 As 
US secretary of state Dean Rusk 
explained to nervous allies at the 
North Atlantic Council, the measures 
were not meant “to rattle the saber, 
we propose to show how quickly 
it can be drawn from the scabbard 
in defence of our obligations and 
rights.”19 As the crisis deepened, the 
Canadian government scrambled to 
increase its military readiness and 
accelerated all of its national survival 
projects. 
Diefenbaker’s Cabinet met five 
times in late August to approve 
measures that would underscore 
Canada’s moral and military support 
for the United States and Berlin. At 
these meetings, defence minister 
Douglas Harkness recommended the 
immediate dispersal of food rations, 
military vehicle stocks, and emergency 
clothing from central warehouses to 
depots outside Canadian target 
areas. A significant number of 
Harkness’s recommendations dealt 
with the NDFRS system. Before the 
Cabinet meetings, General Clark had 
informed Harkness that the Army 
required immediate Treasury Board 
approval to start construction at 
NDFRS sites, to purchase 
and install air raid sirens to 
expand the attack warning 
n e t w o r k ,  a n d  n e e d e d 
nearly $4 million worth 
of  radiat ion detect ion 
equipment. Clark proposed 
to use existing stocks to 
supply FRPs with radiation 
detection equipment as 
soon as possible, so that 
the system could obtain 
“a limited capability in 
about two weeks.” Of 
course, doing so meant 
stripping radiacmeters 
f r o m  t h e  M i l i t i a  a n d 
Regular units tasked with 
re-entering bombed cities 
to rescue civilians, until 
new equipment could be 
procured. 20 Taking Clark’s 
advice to Cabinet, Harkness 
also requested greater 
autonomy for the Army’s 
Area Commands so that 
they could award contracts, 
authorize overtime, and take 
other measures to ensure 
that the NDFRS shelters 
could be built quickly. The 
Cabinet uneasily agreed 
to back the American position over 
Berlin, and acted on Harkness’s 
suggestions and a range of other 
exceptional measures to accelerate 
military and civilian planning for 
nuclear war. 21 
Soon after the Cabinet meeting, 
Treasury Board officials  gave 
advance approval of the military’s 
expenditures to purchase equipment, 
and, more importantly, allowed 
the army headquarters to delegate 
authority for construction to the area 
commanders.22 As a result, general 
officers commanding received 
permission to spend as much as 
$15,500 to build a Filter Centre, 
$6,000 to build a nuclear reporting 
post (NUDET), and $700 for each 
basic basement shelter built for use 
as a fallout reporting post (FRP), 
Major-General John Rockingham 
painted in 1958 by Brenda Bury
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This map shows all the planned locations of fallout reporting posts in 
Manitoba. Each post was assigned a number based on its geographical 
reference location. 
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considerably more than the $500 
Canadian civilians were told would 
be sufficient to build a basement 
shelter.23 Within these limits, the area 
commanders had significant freedom 
to use civilian contract labourers to 
build the shelters, install equipment, 
and purchase needed shelter stocks 
locally. The goal of this new “crash 
program” was to expand the system 
as quickly as possible, with the 
objective of completing the NDFRS 
by January 1962.24 
Armed with discret ionary 
spending powers and additional staff, 
the Canadian Army reached out for 
cooperation from other national and 
provincial agencies. In August 1961, 
the Directorate of Survival Operations 
and Planning (DSO&P) contacted 
key government and private sector 
partners to brief them on the NDFRS 
project and obtain their assistance. 
Two groups were crucial to the 
success of the building program: 
the railways and the RCMP. These 
organizations had outposts in far-
flung locations with access to national 
communications networks that, with 
some adjustment, could be linked in 
to the military signals system. In early 
September, Major-General Arthur 
Wrinch, DSO&P’s chief planner, met 
with the regional heads of Canadian 
National, Canadian Pacific, Ontario 
Northland Railway, and Quebec 
North Shore and Labrador Railway 
to gain their cooperation. The rail 
executives were concerned about 
having to pay “overtime” costs 
associated with manning shelters 
in their stations during a nuclear 
war, but were otherwise supportive. 
They noted that unionized staff 
members would probably sign on to 
staff the fallout shelters because “the 
unions had previously cooperated in 
aircraft spotting, and took it on with 
enthusiasm in spite of the fact that it 
involved rather more effort than will 
be the case in fallout reporting.”25 
After consultation with the unions, 
the major rail networks agreed in 
October to begin building shelters in 
their stations under army supervision 
and at federal expense.26
C o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r 
government departments, including 
the RCMP, proved more difficult to 
arrange than the railway agreement. 
As his colleagues reached out to the 
railways, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward 
Churchill, the engineering officer 
who masterminded construction of 
the Diefenbunker and other major 
projects, worked with federal and 
provincial partners to develop a clear 
division of responsibility for building 
and maintaining the shelters. The 
army would specify which buildings 
required shelters, and what type to 
build, and would work with local 
agencies to find contractors to build 
the shelters. After construction was 
complete, the local agency would 
A partial map of the fallout reporting posts completed as of 1963 near 
Regina, Saskatchewan. Map developed by author.
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look after the shelter’s maintenance 
and would be responsible for staffing 
the shelter in wartime. Churchill 
suggested that reluctant employees 
could be persuaded to volunteer 
as radiation monitors because 
they would be able to bring their 
families into the fallout shelter, and 
“the advantages provided to the 
individual and his family when he 
undertakes this responsibility far 
outweigh any inconveniences.”27 
Soon after Churchill laid out 
his plans, work to complete the 
NDFRS quickly began to founder 
on the rocks of intergovernmental 
and departmental disputes. Central 
Command staff officers reported 
to headquarters in late October 
that, while the Ontario provincial 
government had agreed to cooperate 
with the NDFRS building program, it 
had not passed on information to its 
responsible departments. The Army 
would have to negotiate with each 
department separately to access their 
buildings and make arrangements 
for local construction, with resulting 
months of delay.28 The situation was 
not much better in Quebec Command. 
Militia recruits practice rescue skills during a course at the Lakeview Armoury in September 1961.
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In Rockingham’s headquarters, the 
command engineer complained to 
Ottawa that the January deadline 
could not be met: 
T h e s e  [ l o c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s ] 
involve so many agencies and the 
associated communication problems 
are so complex that considerable 
negotiating and discussion must 
take place before construction can 
begin. These, together with the 
inherent delays imposed by winter 
construction and the inevitable 
loss of time during the Christmas 
period, are bound to slow down the 
programme.29 
Even where federal agencies such 
as the RCMP had agreed to cooperate 
fully with the Army and build 
fallout shelters in its detachment 
houses, getting the cooperation of 
the detachments themselves proved 
difficult. In some cases, shelters could 
not be constructed at all. In Western 
Command, most of the RCMP 
detachments in Alberta operated 
from leased private homes. Their 
standing orders were to undertake 
only short-term rental arrangements. 
The Army would therefore need to 
reach agreement with the property 
owners and obtain reasonable 
assurances that the shelter could be 
staffed in wartime.30 
Not all obstacles to construction 
were so reasonable. Major A.J. 
Arcand, the officer commanding 12 
Works Company, RCE, reported to 
Western Command that he had run 
into substantial opposition from F 
Division RCMP detachments. The 
local Mounties objected to shelter 
construction in their detachments, 
Arcand explained, “in most buildings 
this area is already used or it is 
intended to use it for workshop area, 
storage, exhibit room, clothesdrying 
lines or recreation area. The RCMP 
are not prepared to give up these 
facilities to provide space for a 
shelter.”31 Despite orders from RCMP 
headquarters that “real interference 
must be apparent before denying 
the use of space,” the army engineers 
encountered resistance from local 
detachments where construction 
would temporarily disrupt work or 
otherwise inconvenience employees.32 
The problems with getting the 
NDFRS underway were not entirely 
the result of disagreements with local 
agencies. In most cases, construction 
stalled because of faulty assumptions 
made in area headquarters during the 
initial planning for NDFRS sites in 
the spring of 1961. At that time, area 
commands did their planning from a 
map reconnaissance, armed with lists 
of DND, government, and railway 
properties, to create their rough 45 x 
15 mile grid of fallout reporting posts. 
Once the funds for construction 
began to flow from Treasury Board, 
area command engineers directed 
personnel to conduct hundreds of site 
visits, and negotiate with local staff. 
These military engineers assessed 
the facilities identified in the map 
reconnaissance, sent back sketch 
plans to help HQ produce blueprints 
and manufacturing specifications, 
and identified lists of local contractors 
who could build the shelter at each 
site.33 Approximately 2,000 sites had 
to be assessed across the country, a 
large burden on the area command 
staff personnel. Despite substantial 
efforts by engineering staffs to 
complete their site surveys quickly, 
they were too few to visit every 
site. In Ontario, arranging visits to 
some locations proved very difficult, 
especially in northern parts of the 
province. As Major-General H.A. 
Sparling, GOC Central Command, 
explained to the quartermaster-
general: “It has not been physically 
possible to date to complete the 
preliminary staff reconnaissance. 
To this date, approximately 75% of 
these have been carried out. The main 
problem has been in the northern 
areas…where many of the recces 
have been carried out by air and in 
the case of the railways by handcar.” 
Sparling accurately predicted that 
less than half of the FRPs in his area 
could be completed by the January 
1962 deadline.34 
 In some cases, once engineers 
arrived on-site, their assessment 
revealed that  many bui lding 
basements were unsuitable to house 
The fallout reporting post built beneath a post office in Leduc, Alberta 
was disassembled to make room for this work room.
Co
ur
te
sy
 o
f M
et
ab
ol
ic
 P
ho
to
gr
ap
hy
9
Burtch: Simple Shelters?
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011
58
shelters, either due to lack of space 
or poor building condition. As a 
result, new sites would have to be 
selected, or the building would 
require an above-ground shelter 
at additional cost. In Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick, many of the 
railway stations required shelters 
located outside the facility. Above-
ground shelters could not be built 
cheaply in winter. In Newfoundland, 
reconnaissance parties had to be flown 
into some sites by helicopter. Labour 
and materials would also need to be 
airlifted to these sites, where winter 
construction was impossible, leading 
Eastern Command to cancel or defer 
construction of 68 FRPs in their 
region.35 In western Ontario, a number 
of sites had to be abandoned after the 
reconnaissance group reported that 
no communications links existed in 
the building, requiring a new survey 
of the area and additional site visits.36 
Where shelters could be built, the 
costs varied widely depending on the 
state of the building and cost of local 
labour. Some basement shelters could 
be built for less than $100-200, as was 
the case for a shelter at one of the 
Toronto Area Target Headquarters 
in Newmarket, Ontario, but others 
could be ten times as much. When 
Ontario Provincial Police refused to 
build a shelter outside their district 
headquarters in Perth, Ontario, 
This blueprint shows the design of a standard fallout shelter for use in RCMP detachments. 
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fiscal year. Fortunately, it appeared 
that the Canadian government and 
the armed forces could afford to 
proceed at a more leisurely pace. 
The German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) did much to resolve the 
Berlin crisis in late August 1961 by 
building a wall between East and 
West Berlin. Though American and 
Soviet tanks had a tense standoff 
at one of the crossing points into 
East Berlin, and the West decried 
the GDR’s repressive move, world 
leaders privately breathed a sigh of 
relief. By late 1961, Berlin was no 
longer a flashpoint for conflict. 
The Canadian government 
did not completely let down its 
guard, however, as work proceeded 
on the NDFRS and other, higher-
profile national survival programs 
such as the Special Militia Training 
Plan, an effort to temporarily recruit 
100,000 Canadians into the Militia 
for a six-week course in rescue and 
other civil defence skills.41 A crisis 
of a different type did much to 
derail hopes to complete the NDFRS 
program in 1962. 
Since assuming power in 1957, 
John Diefenbaker’s government 
endured a significant downturn in 
the Canadian economy. The postwar 
boom slowed in the late 1950s, and by 
1961 more than 350,000 Canadians 
were unemployed, approximately 
7.5 per cent of the work force. The 
expanding ranks of unemployed 
steadily drained the government’s 
limited unemployment insurance 
coffers.42 Canada also suffered a 
significant trade deficit with the 
United States, importing a billion 
dollars’ worth of goods more than it 
exported. Confidence in the economy 
fell, and, following a rancorous public 
dispute with the governor of the Bank 
of Canada, Diefenbaker devalued the 
Canadian dollar, and implemented 
austerity measures to control deficit 
spending.43 The Cabinet directed the 
Department of National Defence to 
make cuts in June 1962. Of the $82 
million cut from the defence budget, 
the army’s share totalled $29 million. 
The NDFRS accordingly fell under 
the axe along 
w i t h 
o t h e r 
n a t i o n a l 
s u r v i v a l 
p r o g r a m s , including work 
on the national warning system and 
the military communications system 
meant to connect all the government 
bunkers in wartime. A departmental 
spending review deferred funds to 
construct the 812 remaining FRPs, 
NUDET stations, and filter centres 
until another fiscal year.44 
Major-General Wrinch in DSO&P 
responded with some incredulity, 
noting that the cuts rendered the 
warning and reporting systems non-
effective, leaving the military unable 
to live up to its responsibilities. 
Halting construction on the NDFRS, 
he warned, “could lead to a major 
increase in loss of life in the event 
of an attack.”45 The budget cuts 
effectively crippled the NDFRS. 
Despite intergovernmental confusion 
and slow progress on construction, 
approximately 1,200 FRPs had been 
built or were near completion at the 
time of the departmental review. In 
labourers had to excavate a new 
basement area underneath a vehicle 
garage, at a cost of $2,200.37 Most 
shelters, however, appeared to have 
been built for slightly more than the 
authorized $700 limit. Each of these 
required additional approval from 
Army headquarters, leading to yet 
longer delays. When Rockingham 
requested blanket  permission 
to authorize the construction of 
more expensive shelters in order 
to avoid wasting time on seeking 
case by case approval from Ottawa, 
he was curtly (if accurately) told 
that “small increases in price will 
substantially increase total costs.”38 
The cost of above-ground fallout 
shelters was much higher than the 
average basement construction. 
Above-ground shelters required 
additional fallout protection. One 
design prepared by the Army Works 
Service (AWS) estimated that a 
60 square foot shelter designed to 
house two people would need to be 
surrounded by at least 21 inches of 
crushed stone to adequately shield 
the occupants from radiation. The 
cost of this design was approximately 
$2,900 (nearly $23,000 today).39 In 
Jasper National Park, where shelters 
were planned in the wilderness, 
the cost per shelter sky-rocketed. 
Engineers estimated they would need 
$14,000 to build three shelters in the 
woods.40 The army solicited bids 
from private companies such as the 
Butler Manufacturing Company for 
pre-fabricated shelters that could be 
flown in to remote locations, hoping 
for some savings, but the costs were 
roughly equivalent to those designed 
by the AWS. 
By the time many of these 
problems became apparent, the 
January 1962 deadline had passed. 
Nevertheless, the NDFRS system 
slowly began to take shape. By mid-
1962, shelters had been installed 
at many of the surveyed sites, and 
plans were in place to continue 
with additional installations each 
The Canadian Army procured 
thousands of  IM-108/PD 
radiacmeters like this one 
for National Survival issue. 
Many were installed in fallout 
reporting posts.
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order to become operational, however, 
these reporting posts needed secure 
communications links and equipment 
that could effectively gauge radiation 
levels, or, in the case of nuclear 
detonation posts, the direction and 
intensity of nuclear explosions over 
Canada. An immediate impact of the 
departmental review was the loss of 
funds to establish communications 
links from the shelters to filter centres 
and emergency government bunkers. 
Announcing the austerity measures, 
Harkness indicated that “rentals of 
telephone and teleprinter circuits, 
usually a heavy expenditure, will 
be restricted.”46 If an attack came, 
the government’s ability to map and 
predict fallout patterns would be 
almost entirely dependent on existing 
communications links: railway 
telegraph, commercial telephone, or 
police radio circuits. As Rockingham 
had pointed out in his original 
assessment of the NDFRS, because 
these communications were routed 
through exchanges located in major 
target areas, it was very likely that the 
entire reporting system could be shut 
down in the first stages of an attack 
on North America. 
Discussing the effects of the 
cuts, Harkness also mentioned to 
the press that “procurement of 
some items would be postponed.”47 
This referred to the radiation and 
blast detection material that the 
FRPs and NUDET posts required 
to monitor radiation levels. The 
original design requirements of 
the FRP called for the installation 
of the IM-5015/TD, a radiacmeter 
that could be safely monitored from 
within the shelter, linked to a probe 
attached outdoors. By the time of 
the 1961 crisis over Berlin and the 
crash program, the Canadian Army 
had few of these meters. Instead, 
they distributed stocks of the hand-
held IM-108/TD radiacmeters as 
“interim meters” until sufficient 
5015s could be purchased to equip 
the far-flung reporting outposts.48 
While the official scales of issue for 
each FRP and NUDET post called 
for one 5015 set, the records indicate 
that the hand-held radiacmeters were 
the best that volunteer operators ever 
received.49 One of the key attractions 
of the NDFRS was that volunteers 
could share the shelter with their 
families, offering some promise of 
safety in a post-attack environment. 
Without the remote-reading meter, 
the risks of contaminating the 
shelter and killing the occupants 
increased exponentially. Every 
time the occupant took a reading, 
he or she would have to turn on 
the meter, zero it, don protective 
equipment, and then venture outside 
the shelter to gauge radiation levels. 
The army’s revised instructions for 
fallout reporting using hand-held 
equipment did not inspire confidence: 
“One minute, even 30 seconds, is a 
relatively long time, the exposure 
should be reduced to a minimum 
by rehearsing action before going 
outside…”50 Considering that FRPs 
were required to report each hour, 
each outing meant increased risks 
of radiation sickness, more water 
lost to decontaminating equipment 
and clothing, and greater risks of 
contaminating the shelter itself. 
The 5015 sets eventually came into 
the Canadian Army’s inventory, 
but records indicate that none were 
installed in shelters by the end of 
1962.51 
 By the time of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, 
the Canadian Army had built more 
than half of the facilities required 
for the NDFRS, but these basic 
shelters lacked essential equipment 
or reliable communications. Had a 
war occurred, it is very likely that 
the shelters might have saved some 
lives, but their greater value to the 
government of Canada as a tool 
to advise Canadian citizens about 
fallout patterns would have been 
severely limited. Fortunately for all 
involved, the Cuban crisis passed 
without significant incident, and the 
shelters were not manned at any point 
during the standoff in the Caribbean. 
In the denouement of the crisis, work 
continued on the NDFRS at a slower 
pace, even though army officials close 
to the program privately argued that 
the urgency to complete the program 
was “greater, not less, than it was the 
last summer.”52 
 B y  1 9 6 3 ,  t h e  C a n a d i a n 
government and, by extension, 
the armed forces, had begun to 
move away from civil defence and 
national survival preparations. The 
government shifted responsibility 
for emergency measures to the 
Department of Defence Production, 
preferring to focus on plans for 
natural disasters rather than nuclear 
war. The Army, meanwhile, happily 
if quietly divested itself of many of 
its domestic responsibilities in favour 
of conventional war preparations 
overseas. The military retained 
control of the warning sirens, the 
Diefenbunker, and other provincial 
and regional emergency government 
headquarters. The NDFRS did not 
appear to survive this reorganization. 
The federal government transferred 
control of some shelters to provincial 
emergency measures agencies, to the 
railways, or to local authorities who 
wanted them.53 In 1967, Canadian 
Army personnel toured command 
districts to retrieve communications 
a n d  r a d i a c  e q u i p m e n t  f r o m 
the unused shelters, effectively 
dismantling the fallout reporting 
posts.54 
From 1959 to 1963, the Canadian 
Army engaged in a national project 
to build fallout shelters designed to 
collect and transmit information on 
the fallout that would blanket the 
country following a nuclear attack. 
The shelter-building experience 
highlights a central problem that 
plagued both civilian and military 
efforts to improve the country’s 
passive defences against nuclear war. 
Interagency and interdepartmental 
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bureaucratic confusion slowed the 
implementation of policy, even 
in an emergency situation, while 
fiscal support to the project proved 
fleeting. Like the public, the military 
was forced to make its preparations 
with an imperfect and ultimately 
incomplete warning system. The 
military’s frustrated efforts to 
construct a mere 2,000 shelters goes 
some distance to prove that building 
shelters was not as easy as had 
been advertised to the public in 
government pamphlets such as Your 
Basement Fallout Shelter. Working from 
nearly identical designs, the military 
found that costs often exceeded their 
own generous estimates, which were 
higher than the $500 Canadians were 
told such structures would cost. 
More importantly, army engineers 
discovered that building basement 
shelters in rural municipalities 
proved more difficult than they had 
expected. Their discovery highlights 
some of the flaws in the fallout 
strategy as a whole, for it was in the 
countryside that the population was 
told to seek shelter. Most interesting 
of all is the fact that the army’s 
shelter output during the period 
in question was virtually equal to 
the reported 2,000 family fallout 
shelters built by the public during 
these years. Ultimately, the NDFRS 
was an ambitious but deeply flawed 
aspect of the Canadian Army’s 
national survival program. It was 
carried out for no other reason than, 
like much of Canada’s preparations 
for nuclear war, an imperfect plan 
was better than nothing. Most of the 
NDFRS is gone. As railway stations 
closed, as RCMP and provincial 
police detachments moved from 
leased private housing to purpose-
built facilities, the shelters were left 
behind. Without maintenance, some 
flooded. More often, the shelters 
were destroyed to make room for 
new construction, or filled in and 
buried to save costs. In Meath Park, 
Saskatchewan, the FRP was buried 
when the CPR station was relocated 
and the building renovated to become 
a diner. An extensive survey would 
be required to determine how many 
of the FRPs and other facilities still 
survive. The author has uncovered 
several shelters scattered through 
rural areas, in some cases where the 
original building was preserved as 
a historic site.55 What little remains 
of the NDFRS today, however, is 
physical evidence of the extent of 
nuclear war planning and how it 
touched many communities across 
Canada.
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